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With an estimated 10.6 million inhabitants in 2015 and an average 6.6% annual growth rate, Kinshasa
ranks among the three largest cities in Africa and may well become the most populated. To cope with
critically deficient water services, a local NGO supported by different donors has promoted decentralized
water systems (DWS) that have spread in the city outskirts, based on a model with original features com-
pared to other African experiences. Here, we intend to provide an empirically grounded and analytically
sound inquiry into the relevance, efficiency and sustainability of these DWSs in the context of the megac-
ity of Kinshasa. First, we analyze water provision data from the national water utility and compare these
to the detailed operational results of the DWSs to estimate the magnitude and efficiency of this alterna-
tive mechanism. Second, the principles identified by Elinor Ostrom as being crucial for institutions to suc-
cessfully manage commons provide us with a fruitful analytic framework to assess DWS performance and
sustainability. We show that some of these criteria are broadly met, but the fulfillment of other criteria is
still uncertain. We conclude with a balanced assessment of the efficiency and sustainability of this
approach and identify the key challenges.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In 2012, 38% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population lived in cities,
and 62% of these city dwellers (nearly 213 million people) lived
in slums, a figure that is increasing by 230,000 every week (UN
Habitat, 2013). In urban areas, the rate of private connections to
the water supply network declined from 43% in 1990 to 33% in
2015 (JMP, 2015). Conventional distribution infrastructure thus
only partially covers the urban fabric. The expanding slums are
facing multiple problems in gaining access to water, on a number
of fronts: technical (narrow streets, flood-prone areas, uneven ter-
rain), commercial (identifying properties, street addressing), legal
(users with no title deeds, neighborhoods not in land registries),
political (slum eradication projects often hamper service supply
projects) and institutional (it is not always clear who decides
whether or not to provide services to these areas) (Botton and
Blanc, 2014).The gaps left by the main water utility have led to an increase in
the number of alternative operators, both formal and informal.
Decentralized water systems (DWS) have long existed in urban
areas worldwide, including Africa (Collignon and Vézina, 2000).
They are also found in peri-urban areas as well as rural towns.
These systems can be private or community-managed. They may
depend on a third-party operator for their raw water or produce
it independently (Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005). Examples of this
are the small-scale private operators in Maputo that provide water
to their neighborhoods via ‘‘spaghetti” networks: flexible polyethy-
lene pipes laid directly on the ground and fed from 40 m deep
boreholes (Botton and Blanc, 2014). In Kisumu, Kenya, water sup-
ply to slums is ensured by associations. In Ouagadougou, the
national public utility delegates the service for informal settle-
ments to small operators. In West African rural towns, user associ-
ations play a role in managing services, either providing the water
supply themselves or sometimes delegating it to an operator (Léger
and Etienne, 2011).
These systems may be organized by public authorities (Oua-
gadougou, rural towns in Mali, Benin, etc.), or operate under ser-
vice delegation agreements (Ouagadougou, Benin). Unlike ruraldecen-
2 F. Bédécarrats et al. / Journal of Hydrology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxareas, where user associations often deliver a free or low-cost ser-
vice and are co-managed by volunteer users, peri-urban areas or
small towns resort to paying decentralized services with tariffs
that vary depending on how the risk is shared between the public
and private actors.
In this article, we focus on the situation in Kinshasa, which, with
an estimated population of 10.6 million in 2015, is one of the three
African cities (along with Cairo and Lagos) that can be ranked as a
megacity. Water provision in this metropolis is critically deficient,
raising huge urban management challenges and leading to dire
social and health consequences: diarrheal diseases, time wasted
by women and girls fetching water, etc. In response to these unmet
needs and an ever-growing demand, decentralized water systems
have been promoted by a local NGO with support from interna-
tional donors and expanded in the areas surrounding the city cen-
ter. They currently supply water to more than 500,000 people, a
number expected to double by 2018. Most of the DWSs are run
on a similar model. Typically, they operate with a 100–150 m deep
borehole with a flow rate of 10–60 m3/h, a generator-powered sub-
mersible pump, an elevated reservoir, offices and distribution
pipes supplying from 10 to 45 standpipes as well as connections
for schools and health centers. Each system is designed to supply
from 10,000 to as many as 40,000 people. The chief originality of
Kinshasa’s water user network associations (ASUREPs) is that they
are run on a virtually autonomous basis by non-profit organiza-
tions without State support. However, they charge comparatively
high tariffs and, for the most part, are run by people who are paid
wages or remunerated for attending the association’s meetings.
We thus aim to provide an empirically grounded and analyti-
cally sound inquiry into the relevance, efficiency and sustainability
of DWSs in the city of Kinshasa.
We first describe the technical, economic, social and governance
features of DWSs, highlighting their originality compared to other
water systems observed in large African cities. We analyze service
provision data from the national water utility and compare these
to the detailed operational results of the DWSs in order to estimate
their magnitude and efficiency as an alternative mechanism.
Second, we examine Kinshasa’s DWSs through the prism of the
concept of ‘‘commons”. Although this concept is conventionally
limited to natural resource preservation, we argue that it provides
a fruitful analytic framework for assessing the performance and
sustainability of user-managed basic services. We thus take the
principles that Elinor Ostrom identified as being crucial if institu-
tions are to successfully manage commons (Ostrom, 1990), and
apply these to the Kinshasa case study. We show that some of
these criteria are broadly met, namely, clearly defined boundaries,
adapted rules, collective arrangements for decision-making and
effective monitoring, graduated sanctions and mechanisms for
conflict resolution. However, other criteria still appear to be unful-
filled, particularly recognition by the official authorities of commu-
nity self-determination and the building of an overarching
institutional architecture. These shortcomings jeopardize the
long-run sustainability of such systems. They serve as a reminder
of how important it is to have an enabling institutional environ-
ment at various levels of governance, and also underline the risk
that the coproduction dynamics of basic services – whereby users
participate in the delivery – will run out of steam or be taken over
by the mainstream system.1 Values in brackets show the confidence intervals with a 95% level of confidence.2. Context, data and analytic methods
2.1. Study area
Since the 1990s, the socioeconomic conditions in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have deteriorated. Following aPlease cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
tralized water services in the outskirts of Kinshasa. J. Hydrol. (2016), http://dxseries of conflicts, the country became so impoverished that in
2013 it ranked bottom of the Human Development Index, in
187th place. In 2015, it was in 176th place, but was only ahead
of countries that were conflict-ridden or afflicted by the Ebola
epidemic.
Kinshasa is situated on the Congo River. The city has grown,
spreading southwards and eastwards from the riverbank, as shown
in Fig. 1. It has twenty-four administrative municipalities.
Kinshasa’s population was estimated at 0.2 million by the Bel-
gian colonial administration just before independence, and had
risen to 2.6 million by 1984 according to the only general popula-
tion census carried out to date. Estimates since then have differed
slightly. The most reliable estimates and projections available
seem to be those of UN-Habitat’s latest report on the state of the
world’s cities. Fig. 2 illustrates the increase in the population living
in Kinshasa.
Although the city center is relatively structured, sprawling out-
skirts have mushroomed under the combined effects of rural exo-
dus, rapid population growth and uncontrolled migration, as
shown in Fig. 3.
Several health surveys conducted by the DRC’s National Statis-
tics Institute make it possible to assess the use of improved water
sources in the country’s urban areas.
Fig. 4 shows the estimates for all urban areas in the DRC. Esti-
mates have also been computed specifically for the city of Kinshasa
(Bédécarrats et al., 2016). The overall rate of private connection
stagnated, standing at 45.8% [40.3–51.2%]1 in 2007, 50.2% [44.8–
55.6%] in 2010 and 49.2% [44.8–53.5%] in 2013. The private connec-
tion rate was 12.2% [8.2–16.2%] in the eastern outskirts of the city,
whereas in the other neighborhoods it averaged 75.0% [72.4–
77.5%]. Households in the eastern outskirts of the city have to spend
an average of 28 min [14–42 min] for a round trip to their main
drinking water source, compared with only 3 min [1–5 min] in the
city’s central areas and 7 min [4–10 min] in other suburban neigh-
borhoods. When cumulated, the additional time spent induces a sig-
nificant opportunity cost for marginalized populations and impedes
their social and economic progress (Hutton et al., 2007). In addition,
the most precarious households in the city have to devote a propor-
tionately larger share of their budget to water (almost 5%), despite
consuming smaller quantities. This is consistent with the trends
observed for the rest of the continent, as the unserved usually pay
higher prices (Banerjee et al., 2011, p. 162) (see. Fig. 5–8).
2.2. Operational data to assess the performance of water supply
services
The information produced by the drinking water providers is
used to assess the state of the offering in the Kinshasa metropolitan
area. The technical and commercial indicators of the operators’
performance furnish an overview of the level of the services pro-
posed to residents.
The institutional organization for the water sector is frag-
mented and depends on whether the zones are urban, semi-
urban or rural. In the urban area, the national public water utility,
REGIDESO, manages ninety-five centers, a third of which are no
longer operational, while most of the others have a poor delivery
performance from both the technical and commercial point of
view. In 2009, REGIDESO became a commercial company governed
by private law, fully owned by the State and with a public service
mission. Reform of REGIDESO was launched under the aegis of the
World Bank. The diagnostic study carried out ahead of this reform
provide supplementary operational data on the functioning of
REGIDESO, which had previously been very patchy (SDE-
FINAGESTION, 2014). The reliability of the data is nonethelesscope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
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Fig. 1. Historical map produced for the Kinshasa Metropolitan Area Strategic Master Plan (Guérin et al., 2013).
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Fig. 2. Increase in the population living in Kinshasa (Lelo-Nzuzi and de Saint-Moulin, 2008, p. 72, the 1984 census and UN-Habitat estimates, UN Habitat, 2013, p. 157).
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bureaucratic procedures rather than operational management
tools. This situation is not specific to REGIDESO and often encoun-
tered in public water utilities.
In 1984, water services in rural areas were entrusted to the
National Rural Hydraulic Service (Service National d’Hydraulique
Rurale – SNHR), a technical department under the Ministry of Rural
Development. Although the reform sets an organizational,
advisory-support and regulatory role for the SNHR, it still functions
today as a public works operator (boreholes and pipe laying). The
model prevailing in rural areas, mainly in the east of the country,
involves creating small networks that supply free water, and
entrusting these to user committees. The committees have to find
the money to fund any necessary infrastructure repairs, but this
rarely happens and most of the facilities stop functioning after sev-
eral years (Tsitsikalis, 2014).
The peri-urban areas remain a little-known ‘‘grey zone”, since
public administrations are not very present on the ground. ThesePlease cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
tralized water services in the outskirts of Kinshasa. J. Hydrol. (2016), http://dxareas have greatly expanded recently, but no institution has either
the remit or capacity to build and manage water supply and
treatment facilities for them. In 1999, seven engineers created
the non-profit association ADIR (Action pour le développement
des infrastructures en milieu rural). These engineers had formerly
been SNHR functionaries but were not listed by the SNHR as being
due for reassignment during the country’s years of political
transition – a period when the Congolese State and public admin-
istrations began to collapse in 1991 following a movement of
widespread looting across the country. ADIR began to intervene
in rural areas, particularly in West Kasai Province. At the request
of a Mbuji-Mayi-based mining company that wanted to stop the
residents of five small towns near the mine from intruding onto
its land to draw water, ADIR tested a model of networks managed
on different principles, which we will present below. This model,
dubbed ASUREP, was then replicated from 2007 on in neighbor-
hoods on the outskirts of Kinshasa, in partnership with the Belgian
Technical Cooperation (BTC) and with support from several donorscope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.07.023
Fig. 3. Types of land use, produced for the Kinshasa Metropolitan Area Strategic Master Plan (Guérin et al., 2013).
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and the European Union).
The reasons that led to the choice of this model in Kinshasa are
many (Denormandie, 2014). After a decade that saw cooperation
efforts in the DRC suspended due to the conflicts, donors resumed
their operations in 2003–2004. In the context of a failing State,
crippled water utility and rampant cronyism, community-based
solutions were generally perceived as being the only way of
rebuilding basic services and social cohesion in the short term.Please cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
tralized water services in the outskirts of Kinshasa. J. Hydrol. (2016), http://dxThe legal framework left little room for any alternative other than
REGIDESO for the cities and community-based systems for rural
areas. Small-scale private operators for peri-urban areas were just
beginning to attract the interest of international community prac-
titioners (Collignon and Vézina, 2000). At the time, no private oper-
ator was to be found in Kinshasa; basic needs were partially met
through solidarity and community mechanisms such as religious
groups. Given the massive size of the local informal economy,
the only water supply services to emerge were small privatecope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.07.023
F. Bédécarrats et al. / Journal of Hydrology xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5vendors such as water retailers and cart-pushers. The legal uncer-
tainty overshadowing this type of business, along with the repeat-
edly predatory behavior of the different authorities, discouraged
private actors from investing in immobilized assets such as pipes,
boreholes and pumps. Despite their community-based character,
the ASUREPs have a strong economic dimension and manage to
break even in their operations. The water tariff set for each ASUREP
allows for full cost recovery. ADIR proposes a calculation model
that encompasses wages, energy costs, depreciation and amortiza-
tion expenses and various management costs. These parameters
are calculated by each ASUREP and depend on the characteristics
specific to each distribution network. Operating and maintenance
costs, which total around USD 1/m3, are relatively high due to
the heavy energy costs generated by the technical characteristics
of the networks. The tariffs observed vary between USD 1.75/m3
and 2.5/m3. Data on the ASUREPs’ monthly activities were col-
lected and compiled in a database in order to analyze the function-
ing of these networks (see below).2.3. Strategic analysis of the institutional processes
The final part of our analysis focuses on the governance of the
ASUREPs. Our aim was to describe and understand as precisely as
possible how these organizations operate, both in principle and
in practice. Our data sources included numerous field observations,
interviews with key stakeholders and the study of the reports pro-
duced by the ASUREPs and ADIR since 2006.
Grasping how a system is governed means understanding not
only its formal rules, but also the way in which these are re-
interpreted for practical application when confronted with infor-
mal norms and concrete issues. This approach is much like the
strategic analysis used by the sociology of organizations (Crozier,
1992), which involves observing and documenting in detail how
activities are run, with a particular focus on situations that gener-
ate power relationships. These situations reveal not only what
structures collective action, but also the disturbances induced by
the specific objectives of individuals or groups that are part of
the organization.
This type of analysis involves going beyond the often simplistic
understanding of institutional governance popularized by manage-
ment sciences under the notion of ‘‘corporate governance”. The lat-
ter concept considers that the tensions that exist in organizations
are mainly the results of diverging interests between a company’s
owners and its employed management team. In reality, these rela-
tionships are ambiguous and, more importantly, they involve
many more stakeholders: employees, users or external actors are
not neutral players.
Rather than promote ready-made organizational models that
comply with established technical and economic standards, the
challenge of creating sustainable systems involves crafting institu-
tions adapted to their local context and negotiated jointly with all
of their stakeholders. Particularly in spaces where public authority
is weak or where informal stop-gap mechanisms predominate, the
consolidation of a viable service depends on developing and estab-
lishing sustainable norms and rules and on the different stakehold-
ers agreeing to participate (Barrau and Frenoux, 2010).
As with irrigation systems, we strongly suspect that, in the case
of the ASUREPs, the ‘‘crux of the problem still lies in defining the
rules of the game governing water distribution and network oper-
ation, and in the way that the organizations responsible for imple-
menting them are structured.” (Lavigne Delville, 2009, p. 5). We
thus base our study on the principles that Elinor Ostrom pin-
pointed as being crucial for institutions to successfully govern
the commons.Please cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
tralized water services in the outskirts of Kinshasa. J. Hydrol. (2016), http://dx2.4. Commons theoretical and methodological framework
Elinor Ostrom has empirically shown that many resources, par-
ticularly natural resources, can be pooled and managed locally by
various small groups that craft ad-hoc rules to avoid depleting
these shared goods. She refutes ‘‘the tragedy of the commons”
developed in 1968 by Garret Hardin, who argues that when a
resource is freely accessible, each user spontaneously tends to
draw on the resource without constraint, which leads to its disap-
pearance. In a publication that has been foundational for the study
of common pool resources (CPR), Ostrom draws on a series of suc-
cessful experiences of long-standing and, stable institutions in
order to identify the key determinants of their robustness and per-
sistence over time. She identifies eight criteria: clearly defined
boundaries, congruence between appropriation and provision rules
and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring,
graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, minimal
recognition of the right to organize, and multiple layers of nested
enterprises (Ostrom, 1990, p. 90). She also investigates the way
in which incentives for participants in resource management are-
nas are crucial to fostering institutional changes that enable collab-
orative collective action, and how attempts to impose resource
management rules from outside meet with failure in the long run.
These eight principles have since been used by different schol-
ars to assess the resilience of local governance arrangements for
irrigation, land tenure, forestry and pasture resources (Dietz
et al., 2003). In several cases, they have been applied to systems
in operation over several generations in order to identify the dri-
vers of their longevity (Ostrom, 1993; Tucker, 1999; Weinstein,
1999). They have also been used to analyze relatively recent
attempts to establish new CPRs in developing countries (Morrow
and Hull, 1996; Nilsson, 2001) and, in these cases, have helped to
highlight the fragility of donor-driven initiatives.
The analytical grid developed by Elinor Ostrom thus provides an
interesting toolbox for analyzing the sustainability of these sys-
tems. However, in the present case, the resource is not scarce
and involves above all pooling services, which constitutes an inter-
esting example giving insights that can inform the theoretical
framework of the commons. So far, this framework has been used
mainly to analyze systems where the prime purpose is to preserve
land or natural resources. The analysis has thus targeted the pri-
mary sector, while the secondary sector only enters the picture
to the extent that it impacts the environment and land. Studies
on the commons have mostly analyzed services insofar as they rely
on a digital heritage such as code (Linux) or information (Wikipe-
dia) (Coriat, 2011).
Our approach also queries the economic textbook classification
of goods according to their rivalry (the consumption of a good by
one agent prevents its simultaneous consumption by other agents)
and their excludability (one agent can prevent another agent from
using the good). Private goods are thus defined as rival and exclud-
able, public goods as non-rival and non-excludable, club goods as
non-rival and excludable, and common goods as rival and non-
excludable (McKean, 2000, p. 3). This classical approach applies
both to goods that constitute stocks and goods that above all
involve flows.
The analysis of the ASUREPs requires a slightly different
approach focused more on service and flow, which gives rise to
specific characteristics. A resource is a good that already exists or
constitutes an accumulated capital, whereas a service is created
by human activity and its value cannot be stored. In the case of
resources, value-added depends entirely on their extraction,
whereas the value of a service is produced by those providing it.
In the present case, there is no scarcity of the resource, as Kinshasa
is underlain by a productive shallow aquifer that is easilycope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.07.023
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(grès polymorphes) and soft sandstone running under the entire city
constitutes a deep aquifer with good hydraulic characteristics; it
ensures the sustainability of the water resource in terms of quan-
tity and quality (Lateef et al., 2010). What is rare, on the other
hand, is for the water to be abstracted and made available to the
population on a continuous basis. The distinctive criterion lies
not so much in rivalry (competition for an existing good) as in
the premium gained through cooperation (without cooperation,
the service would not exist).
This focus on service echoes the notion of ‘‘coproduction”, also
coined byOstrom (1973) and defined as ‘‘the process throughwhich
inputs used to provide a good or service are contributed by individ-
ualswho are not ‘in’ the sameorganization” (Ostrom, 1996, p. 1073).
Initially used to describe different forms of partnership between
state and non-state actors in the actual provision of a service, this
notion has evolved over time to focus more specifically on the role
of ordinary citizens in producing public goods. Yet the debate con-
tinues on how to define the scope of coproduction phenomena. In
other words, does it indeed constitute a genuine grassroots strategy
that could enable social movements to enhance their influencewith
respect to state institutions (Mitlin, 2008) or is it above all a neo-
liberal strategy for managing basic services in order to neutralize
other more violent forms of contestation (Jaglin, 2005)?
Another important analytical tool developed by Elinor Ostrom
and participants in the CPR research program is the social-
ecological systems (SES) framework (Ostrom, 2009). This frame-
work has been designed as a shared language enabling different
scientific disciplines to share methods and findings on natural
resources management. It seems to be a relevant approach to dis-
entangle the underlying the determinants of commons’ sustain-
ability. The SES framework has for instance been convincingly
applied to understanding the conditions that, despite chaotic
urbanization, favored efficient collective actions to preserve some
lakes in Bangalore despite chaotic urbanization, whereas other
lakes have been severely depleted (Nagendra and Ostrom, 2014).
However, some methodological trade-offs need to be made
when using with such a generic transdisciplinary framework,
which is adaptable to any resource management system, whatever
its scale and complexity. Unpacking its modelling approach is con-
ceptually cumbersome and lengthy to explain in an article: the SES
framework is designed to encompass several system layers. Each
layer is characterized through six concepts (resource system,
resource units, governance system, actors, interactions and out-
comes), and by a set of 49 generic variables. Adapting the concepts
and selecting the relevant variables for specific cases is no meager
task and implies carefully following and documenting a precise
procedure (Hinkel et al., 2015). This approach is far more com-
pelling when it draws on a comparative approach between differ-
ent CPR situations, or is supported by an in-depth theoretical
discussion (Poteete et al., 2010, pp. 232–245). The SES framework
thus seems to offer an appropriate toolbox to obtain a general
overview of the determinants of DWS sustainability at the level
of the DRC or African urban areas. We will nevertheless defer this
analysis for a future study and focus here on the sustainability
principles that will feed into a discussion centered on the context
of the megacity of Kinshasa.3. Results
3.1. Operators’ technical and financial performance
3.1.1. Drinking water needs are covered by a mosaic of operators
The shared findings of local actors at the consultation meetings
of the Strategic Master Plan for the Kinshasa Metropolitan AreasPlease cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
tralized water services in the outskirts of Kinshasa. J. Hydrol. (2016), http://dx(Schéma d’Orientation Stratégique de l’Agglomération de Kinshasa
–SOSAK) are indisputable (Guérin et al., 2013). The networks of the
public water utility do not cover the entire city and, even where
they exist, distribution is unreliable and creates water supply prob-
lems. It is difficult to extend and improve the supply given that the
rights of way required for laying newwater lines are congested and
the scarcity of available land blocks the construction of the neces-
sary facilities (reservoirs, pumping stations). Surface water
abstraction points are often polluted; the poor quality of water,
which carries an excess of soil from erosion in the upstream catch-
ment area, impacts the water treatment processes. This reduces
the quantity of water produced, which is already insufficient for
the city’s needs.
The population’s drinking water requirements are thus covered
by a variety of technical solutions, ranging from the networks to
itinerant vendors, wells and boreholes. The most common forms
of supply are via the national public utility, REGIDESO, and the
independent decentralized networks managed by neighborhood
associations. Spatially, these are juxtaposed in a center-
peripheries pattern. The mosaic of the different means of access
is shown on the Fig. 5. The lines and points represent REGIDESO’s
primary and secondary networks and the different colored areas
indicate service continuity as assessed by REGIDESO in preparation
for a series of improvement projects. The hatched zones represent
the administrative areas of the neighborhoods benefiting from
decentralized services. The broken line corresponds to the limit
of urbanization in June 2012 based on satellite images available
at this date. The outermost areas are the very sparsely populated.
To organize the ASUREPs, ADIR has taken advantage of the
openings offered by the DRC law on non-profit associations and
organizations of public utility, and has chosen a neighborhood or
group of two neighborhoods as its intervention unit. This choice
enables the scope of the network to be defined and matched with
the municipality’s administrative subdivisions. ADIR starts the pro-
cess by meeting the mayor of the municipality concerned to inform
him of the works due to be carried out in the neighborhoods of his
municipality. The NGO’s representatives also explain the project
requirements, mainly the fact that the land needed for building
the works (boreholes, reservoir, administrative buildings and
standpipes) must be transferred free of charge by the beneficiaries
(neighborhood populations), and that the water system will be
managed by the user association that will be set up, without any
involvement from the municipality. With the mayor’s agreement,
ADIR then meets the neighborhood leaders to explain this
approach to them. The leaders then convene the local notables –
mainly the leaders of a street or group of streets – to a meeting
where the same information is communicated and awareness-
raising sessions are scheduled street by street.
Next, after publishing an announcement in the press, ADIR
recruits interviewers who are tasked with counting the neighbor-
hood populations, as data from the municipal authorities are often
inaccurate. For an average-size Kinshasa neighborhood, four inter-
viewers are needed over four days. On the basis of the numbers
collected, ADIR calculates a representativeness coefficient by divid-
ing the number of people registered by the estimated number of
general assembly delegates. This ratio determines how many dele-
gates are allocated to a street or whether one or two streets need
grouping together to be entitled to a delegate. Once this procedure
is completed, awareness-raising days are organized in the form of
focus groups on the theme of creating a user association (and the
need to democratically elect delegates), the association’s function-
ing as a non-profit structure, the way the network works and the
obligations of the neighborhood residents concerned.
Following this awareness-raising phase, elections are organized
and monitored by ADIR. During the voting process, each partici-
pant signs an attendance sheet and all the candidates – who havecope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
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are given five minutes each to campaign ahead of a secret ballot.
There are from 45 to 70 delegates in each ASUREP. They are
elected for a three-year term, renewable once, and constitute the
general assembly (GA). It is often difficult to have more than a
quarter of female delegates despite encouragement from the
facilitators.
Once all the delegates have been elected, ADIR submits model
statutes for a non-profit association to them. After they have
amended and approved these in various meetings that may be
drawn out over one or two months, ADIR sees to it that the amend-
ments do not deflect the ASUREP too far from its initial objective,
are fully legal and dovetail with the ASUREP model. The statutes
and the rules of procedure are formally adopted at the constituent
general assembly. At this same meeting, the delegates elect six or
seven members onto the Board and three members to the Bureau
of the GA. The Board launches a call for applications to recruit a
management unit comprising a manager, an accountant and a
cashier (male or female). These are hired in line with their skills,
must necessarily reside in the neighborhood and have not family
member who is a delegate. The members of the management unit
have an employment contract and are paid; their salary varies from
one ASUREP to another depending on the association’s results. The
manager, the accountant and the cashier, the maintenance person,
the standpipe personnel and the janitors make up the management
unit and are in charge of the network’s day-to-day operation. The
unit sends a monthly report to the Board, to the Bureau of the
GA and to ADIR, which is responsible for supporting the ASUREP
in question. These meet to examine the report, discuss it, give their
opinions and see that the recommendations made at previousPlease cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
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agement unit to communicate these decisions and ensure they
are put into application.
At all of the meetings, the participants receive ‘‘attendance
fees”, the amount of which is set by the GA in line with the ASUR-
EP’s financial results. These typically vary from USD 5 to 20 per
meeting. The money received from the sale of water is deposited
in the local bank or micro-finance institution by the Bureau trea-
surer on ASUREP’s bank account or, if the association does not
yet have all the required documents, on the account of another
older ASUREP until the situation is regularized. To guard against
the risk of depreciation of the Congolese currency, the funds are
converted into dollars before being deposited with the bank. The
GA appoints and duly authorizes co-signatories for the account.
As a rule, these are the president of the Board and the manager
heading the management unit. At year-end, if the ASUREP’s
accounts report a positive margin, the GA can decide to allocate
the surplus to actions that benefit the whole community.
3.1.2. Challenges and failings of the centralized network services
In 2014, an independent report on REGIDESO’s operations
judged that ‘‘poor network coverage and rapid, unbridled urban
sprawl due to the rural exodus and partly to those displaced by
war are all parameters that make drinking water supply increas-
ingly difficult, especially in the peripheral neighborhoods” (SDE-
FINAGESTION, 2014, p. 8). While 1,789,100 households were esti-
mated to live in the metropolitan area in 2012 (Makabu ma
Nkenda, 2014, p. 36), the document reported a total of 259,454
customers (SDE-FINAGESTION, 2014), 67% of whom were active,
and 69% of these were not equipped with water meters. This meanscope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.07.023
8 F. Bédécarrats et al. / Journal of Hydrology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxthat fewer than 53,341 customers had meters, most of these being
old, non-operational and above all not regularly read by the meter
readers. As volume estimates are unreliable, it is difficult to grasp
what actual use was made of the service. Until 2015, the service
was delivered almost entirely via house connections. Standpipes
on the REGIDESO network are few and often out of order
(Tsitsikalis, 2014). Out of the six REGIDESO service areas in Kin-
shasa, the two covering the eastern part of the city show alarming
figures: only 50% of the 72,635 customers are active and only 6343
have a meter.
REGIDESO estimates that it produced 184,750,000 m3 in Kin-
shasa in 2013. Over the same period, it billed 83,350,000 m3 for
domestic customers and 13,522,000 m3 for government institu-
tions and administrations. The network’s overall efficiency (vol-
umes billed/volumes produced) is 52% and has stagnated at this
level since the early 2000s (REGIDESO, 2012). Thus, 1 in every 2 L
is lost due to technical and commercial losses, which is a mediocre
performance compared to other operators in the sub-region. The
production ratio per inhabitant of 48 liters per capita per day (lpcd)
is low and results from chronic under-investment in the produc-
tion facilities and a use rate that is lower than nominal capacity
due to technical failures (mainly power cuts).
The volumes billed by REGIDESO in Kinshasa amount to
265,403 m3/day, equivalent to 25 lpcd. For a capital city that is
home to economic and administrative activities, this ratio is low.
Given the extent of its networks, service levels vary greatly
depending on the geography, from an estimated 160 lpcd in the
city center to 0 lpcd in neighborhoods not served. For the two ser-
vice zones in east Kinshasa, the bill collection rate is around 55%,
which is generally a sign of poor service.
By way of comparison, the design criteria targeted in the draft
National Policy for Public Water Service (Politique Nationale du
Service Public de l’Eau), as referred for consultation in August
2013, recommended the following standards: 50 lpcd for urban
areas, 30 lpcd for semi-urban areas and 20 lpcd for rural areas, to
be applied countrywide. These targets have the merit of being pro-
gressive but it should be remembered that the usual design stan-
dards for a city are from 100 to 150 lpcd. The production average
in most of the sub-region’s cities is about 100 lpcd (Guérin et al.,
2013).3.1.3. Inventive decentralized water systems on the rise on the city
outskirts
The ASUREPs ensure on their own all the functions for manag-
ing the water service: organizing the service (setting service levels
and opening hours), operation and maintenance via technical,
commercial and financial management and the renewal and exten-
sion of the facilities. They operate with a high degree of autonomy,
be it in recruiting personnel or setting tariffs.0 
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borhoods. They are designed from the outset to provide service
for all of a neighborhood’s residents. As a result, in each of the ser-
vice areas, each ASUREP delivers a ‘‘medium” quality of service
through standpipes spread over the respective zone.
The DWSs managed by the ASUREPs have grown significantly in
recent years, as shown in Fig. 6.
The ASUREPs’ technical performances are relatively satisfactory,
showing unaccounted-for-water at 13% in 2015 and service inter-
ruptions only in exceptional cases (pump or generator failures,
breaks in a borehole casing pipe or cables). The payment scheme
ensures that all distributed water volumes are paid for, apart from
the free quotas granted to owners of the plots on which the water
facilities have been built.
According to the ASUREP population count, the number of res-
idents in all of the neighborhoods served in 2015 was 560,564.
Assuming that all of this population is supplied by the ASUREPs,
the average consumption volume is 5.9 lpcd. This figure is low
but relatively in line with the actual volumes measured in similar
standpipe distribution systems in peri-urban and semi-urban areas
in West Africa. It is generally recognized by the sector’s practition-
ers that the WHO consumption standard of 20 lpcd is poorly
adapted to standpipe networks and systematically leads to oversiz-
ing the infrastructure (Roberts, 1998). In the Sahel, the observed
specific consumption on new networks is around 8 lpcd, rising to
as much as 12 lpcd after two or three years, bearing in mind that
the targeted objective is 20 lpcd (Faggianelli and Desille, 2013, p.
15). In Burkina Faso, the indicators produced by a professional
standpipe network operator show specific consumption from 5 to
10 lpcd (Léger and Etienne, 2011). In the best performing ASUREPs,
specific consumption is higher, exceeding 10 lpcd and even reach-
ing 15 lpcd, as for example in Mangana.
3.2. Precarious sustainability of decentralized systems
As in the case of irrigation systems, which Elinor Ostrom most
often used for her analysis, we consider that institutions are critical
to enable effective and sustainable service. We thus based our
study on the principles that this strand of analysis recognizes as
crucial if institutions are to succeed in managing commons.
3.2.1. Clearly defined boundaries
Decentralized networks are set up within administratively
defined areas that have local government representatives (neigh-
borhood leaders). The mayors explicitly recognize the ASUREPs’
autonomy and landowners grant them right of use on their land.
Membership of the association is restricted to a neighborhood’s
landowners, who are called on to elect delegates from their ranks.
It can take a long time to obtain the official status of non-profit
association and some ASUREPs have been operating for several2012
3 networks)
2013
(26 networks)
2014
(27 networks)
2015
(27 networks)
Volumes distributed (m3)
and distributed by the ASUREPs.
cope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.07.023
0 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
m
3
Volumes produced Volumes distributed
Fig. 7. Evolution of volumes produced and distributed by the ASUREPs of Disasi neighborhood.
F. Bédécarrats et al. / Journal of Hydrology xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 9years on the grounds that other ASUREPs have a recognized legal
existence, while awaiting completion of the administrative
formalities.
The statutes of a non-profit association limit the scope of action
to the neighborhood of origin but state that their activities can be
extended to include nearby neighborhoods. In addition, observa-
tions show that users freely cross these limits – the residents of
a nearby neighborhood not yet equipped with a DWS can come
to collect their water from a nearby ASUREP; this also happens in
the case of a temporary failure. The solidarity between ASUREPs
also oversteps these neighborhood limits, as some pool their finan-
cial resources to help an ASUREP with insufficient funds to carry
out a major repair. One also finds ASUREPs operating as a whole-
saler selling the water of third-party suppliers.
Some networks find themselves competing with or hindered by
adjacent networks, which may be private (managed by religious
congregations, for example) or public (REGIDESO). The question
of interfacing with REGIDESO was addressed in 2006, when a pro-
tocol of agreement was signed between REGIDESO and the Belgian
Technical Cooperation, which at the time was supporting the cre-
ation of the first ASUREPs. This protocol clearly provides for the
separation between intervention areas: mini-networks are not to
be created in areas where REGIDESO is present and reciprocally
REGIDESO will not intervene in the management of these mini-
networks. In practice, in 2015, the outlying areas served by some
ASUREPs overlap with areas partly served by REGIDESO.
Disasi is a case in point. In 2013, when an ASUREP was created
in this neighborhood, no standpipe had been installed in the north
of this neighborhood, which was located close to one of REGIDESO
distribution pipelines. As this pipeline had no water, the residents
affected made several requests to the ASUREP, which finally agreed
to extend its network to this part of the neighborhood. At the same
time, however, REGIDESO rehabilitated the piping and restored its
service. The REGIDESO service is intermittent but for the residents
has the advantage of being free of charge. In fact, in addition to the
non-payment of bills (50%), it is common practice for the popula-
tion to pierce the pipes and draw water directly, and these prac-
tices go unpunished. Due to this territory-based competition, the0 
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in Fig. 7.
Following REGIDESO’s restored service on the edge of the Disasi
neighborhood, the volumes of water distributed by the ASUREP in
2104 stagnated, then decreased in 2015 with a sharp drop at the
end of the period considered. In August 2015, only half of the
standpipes in this neighborhood were still in service.
When the networks are not up against competition on their
fringes, their volumes generally tend to expand gradually and con-
tinuously, as the Fig. 8 below shows.
As in Mikonga, the main service problems for the ASUREPs are
climate-related. The seasonal variability seen at year-end is due
to heavy rains. Annual rainfall is around 1450 mm and the rainy
season stretches from October to May. This rainfall provides house-
holds with a free supply of water (pond water, roof water), but it
also prevents the standpipes from operating as they have no pro-
tective covering and cause technical problems for the networks,
such as pipe breaks due to erosion. These erosion-related problems
are likely to intensify with the increasingly violent rainfall brought
on by climate change (Mufwaya and Muchuru, 2015).
3.2.2. Advantages proportional to the costs assumed
The correlation between the benefits reaped by the actors and
their contributions need to be studied according to the type of
actor. All the information collected suggests that almost all neigh-
borhood residents use the mini-networks and pay the same tariffs
for standpipe water. Some people however have a special relation-
ship with their ASUREP.
Owners of the plots on which the decentralized network facili-
ties are built are entitled to a free daily quota ranging from 50 to
100 L. However, in view of the income generated by the ASUREPs,
many people are calling for these rules to be adapted, or even for
the land used for these facilities to be bought from the owners.
For the elected delegates, there is a sometimes strong tempta-
tion to step up the number of meetings in order to increase the
amount of attendance fees that they receive. However, the distri-
bution formulae adopted by the ASUREP’s general assembly set a
quota for the amount of total income that can be allocated to thisVolumes distributed
ted by the ASUREPs of Mikonga neighborhood.
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brought into play to ensure that excessive spending does not jeop-
ardize the financial sustainability of the systems.
For users, the price set by the ASUREPs to cover their costs is
high (between USD 1.75 and 2.5/m3). REGIDESO applies a complex
pricing system that makes it structurally loss-making, but which is
slightly lower. The selling price per m3 was USD 0.35 for residential
subscribers, compared to USD 1.54 for the small number of REGI-
DESO standpipes (SDE-FINAGESTION, 2014). The ASUREP price
per m3 is generally around USD 2.1. This however is a ‘‘retail price”
that ensures full cost recovery, whereas the average REGIDESO
price only partly covers costs. This is one of the reasons why the
service provided by REGIDESO has deteriorated. REGIDESO is thus
locked into a vicious circle: the low quality service leads dissatis-
fied users to not pay their bills, which further aggravates the oper-
ator’s financial difficulties.
In Kinshasa, 36.8% of the population live under the poverty line,
18.8% are unemployed and only 5% of those who have a jobs are
salaried employees (Makabu ma Nkenda, 2014). A low average
level of income and, more importantly, the irregularity of this
income push precarious households into adopting highly compli-
cated financial strategies, where it is very difficult to plan for the
future (Collins et al., 2009). In this setting, the conventional water
supply systems based on subscription and monthly billing for
water consumed seem ill adapted. Moreover, water consumption
per inhabitant is low and the capacity to invest in connections is
very limited. It seems that a system more adapted to the users
would offer the possibility of purchasing reduced volumes paid
for in cash as and when the water is consumed. The price thus
seem high but represents an apparently affordable daily expense
for a large number of households who appreciate being able to
obtain good quality water from a standpipe that is generally
located less than 250 m from their home.
3.2.3. Procedures for making collective choices
Each ASUREP is set up as an independent legal entity, regulated
by a standard associative model defined by the DRC Law No.
004/2001 on non-profit associations and public interest organiza-
tions. All of them have adopted very similar statutes and rules of
procedure, following the model recommended by ADIR. Only
minor changes have been made: perimeter of operation, the num-
ber of delegates and the choice of a currency. The statutes set the
rules for joining or leaving the association. The rules of procedure
define the decision-making process. These documents are long (78
articles) and specify in detail the responsibilities of each body or
function. They also set out the procedures for convening and hold-
ing meetings, as well as the conditions for validating the meetings
and possible appeals. Deliberation and decision-making mecha-
nisms follow strict rules. For example, different voting systems
(vote by acclamation, raising hands or secret ballot) are provided
for, depending on the sensitivity of the item under discussion. In
addition, these bodies systematically produce minutes, which
must be circulated and endorsed by the different recipients.
That said, decision-making is strictly controlled by ADIR. This
supporting NGO closely monitors how the ASUREP is run during
its first year. And even afterwards, it will step in if the ASUREPs
are contemplating decisions likely to challenge the model’s initial
design. So far, there are no examples of important decisions run-
ning counter to ADIR’s advice. While this helps to ensure sustain-
able services, the real empowerment of the ASUREPs is hard to
gauge so long as there are no crises that give the last word to the
community itself.
3.2.4. Oversight and monitoring
The governance of ASUREPs involves several tiers of oversight:
the management unit is supervised by the Board, the Board byPlease cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
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functional, users can call an extraordinary GA if a petition request-
ing this is signed by at least 100 users. The GA is convened
quarterly in the first year in order to empower the delegates vis-
à-vis managing the ASUREP, then every six months from the sec-
ond year on. At each of these meetings the Board submits a report,
and resources and expenses are discussed in a plenary session. The
GA must also give prior approval for any staff recruitment (man-
agement unit, plumbers, maintenance staff, standpipe workers
and guards) proposed by the Board. If any suspicion arises, the
GA may also set up a management unit oversight commission,
but this will be given a fixed term and precise mandate.
ADIR also plays a key oversight role. We conducted a quarter-
long informal survey to identify this activity. Between July and
September 2015, the NGO team processed 45 ASUREP activity
reports, participated in 42 joint meetings attended by the Bureaus
of the GA and the Board, attended 8 GAs (5 ordinary and 3 extraor-
dinary) and checked the management tools of 15 ASUREPs. Over
these three months, the survey enabled ADIR to detect shortcom-
ings such as errors in the allocation of expenditure; the GA inter-
fering in the Board’s affairs in connection with the association’s
financial management; irregularities in the use of management
tools; delays in sending out GA reports; incomplete or inaccurate
monthly activity reports; expenses not related to network opera-
tions; improper use of generators; unnecessary meetings held with
no obvious impact on improving the network, but rather to receive
the attendance fee; investments in unprofitable ancillary activities;
and tardy maintenance of generators and pumps, etc.3.2.5. Differentiated and graduated sanctions
Employees, elected delegates or users who break the rules face
sanctions. Varying disciplinary measures are provided for, adapted
to the gravity and circumstances of the misconduct.
Individual members who contravene the obligations defined in
the rules may be sanctioned on the Board’s decision and subject to
approval by the GA. The starting penalties, a warning and official
reprimand, are merely symbolic but socially stigmatizing as they
are handed out during a meeting attended by neighbors. Measures
can extend to temporary suspension or a permanent ban in serious
cases. A ban may also involve closing a standpipe if the member in
question owns the plot where the standpipe was erected. This was
the case in Mbuala in 2013, when the owner clearly abused the
system by drawing much more water than the amount allocated
to him free of charge.
Employees convicted of fraud are dismissed through the same
mechanism and this situation has already arisen several times.
There are also instances where elected Board members have been
collectively dismissed by the GA when it was deemed that the
Board’s management was unsatisfactory (ASUREPs in Manta and
Mimpa in 2014). An ASUREP may also be placed under supervision
by the federation of ASUREPs in the event of repeated failures.3.2.6. Multi-tiered systems
A federation of ASUREPs (FEDASU) has been formed, grouping
together the ASUREP legal entities. The FEDASU’s management
functions (presidency, secretariat, treasury) are filled by ASUREP
delegates on a three-year rotating basis. This organization is still
being legalized, a process that can take several years in the DRC,
but in any event it is already operational. Its purpose is to repre-
sent the ASUREPs’ interests in dealings with Congolese political
authorities or other actors, and also to provide services to its mem-
bers: assistance with setting-up, conflict resolution, technical
assistance, cash management, bulk purchasing, etc. Its long-term
purpose is thus to ensure the functions that were originally
performed by ADIR when the ASUREPs were being formed.cope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
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Conflicts are frequent within ASUREPs. Clashes can erupt
between the GA and the Board, as was the case with the ASUREP
in the Révolution neighborhood in late 2014, when the GA com-
missioned an audit of the Board, and then convened an extraordi-
nary general assembly to have the Board dismissed. There may also
be conflicts between the Board and the management unit, for
example in the Nsele Bambou ASUREP in late 2014, when the pres-
ident took over the dismissed manager’s place, but the relationship
with staff teams was strained. Conflicts can also occur between
street delegates sitting on the GA and the rest of the population.
This was the case in the Munga ASUREP, when most representa-
tives were not re-elected at the end of their term after a rebellion
that challenged the association’s lack of accountability. Resolving
these internal conflicts in the ASUREPs mentioned relies mainly
on the mechanisms set out in the associations’ statutes and rules
of procedure, and ADIR generally acts as mediator. The FEDASU
will eventually become the highest-tier mediation body, being col-
lectively empowered to make decisions that can be imposed on
any one of their member associations.
Conflicts can also arise between ASUREPs and other actors,
which then requires external mediating mechanisms. The neigh-
borhood leaders and traditional chiefs often play a mediating role,
but this may not suffice. At neighborhood level, the public admin-
istration is virtually non-existent. Some local leaders may also
abuse their position, which then results in the case being taken
to court or in a negotiated resolution. In 2014, a conflict broke
out between an ASUREP and a parish as the local priest was con-
suming more than his free water quota. Criminal charges were
filed, but the case was dismissed by the state prosecutor’s office.
Elsewhere, a traditional chief and his brothers demanded that
the ASUREP immediately buy the plot of land where the operating
facility and machinery were located, even though the land had
been ceded at no cost by the leader himself when the ASUREP
was created. In this case, given the actors’ influence, arbitration
proceedings were initiated with a large number of the ASUREP’s
delegates, then brought before the GA. Finally, the land was pur-
chased for USD 3000, which is a relatively high amount but still
within the upper range of prices recorded for this type of land.
The most serious conflicts sometimes need to be referred to the
judicial authorities. ADIR has sometimes contracted a law firm to
provide legal support to the ASUREPs. This firm has, for example,
intervened on the case of a manager who was dismissed for
embezzlement and mismanagement in Ngina-Mpasa, and on the
case of a land dispute over a plot on which a network reservoir
was built.
3.2.8. State recognition of the right to self-organization
ADIR and the technical and financial partners that supported
the creation of ASUREPs have feared from the outset that REGI-
DESO or more particularly government authorities would question
the ownership of ASUREP facilities. Given the high income gener-
ated by mini-networks and the possible predatory behavior that
this could incite, legal protection for these systems is a key issue
for their survival.
ASUREPs have a legal status at constitution, but the recognition
process still demands a great deal of perseverance before reaching
the final stage; the issuance of a decree from the Minister of Justice,
published in the official gazette. Pending this, the ASUREPs receive
a provisional operating permit confirming receipt by the Ministry
of Justice of their application for non-profit status, which enables
them to operate legally. The ASUREPs also pay the relevant taxes
and contributions, in particular the business tax on salaries and
social security contributions for their employees.
From a legal perspective, the built facilities belong to the Con-
golese State, but they have been conceded by ministerial decreePlease cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
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ever, the legal validity of this arrangement is fragile, given the inac-
curacies and contradictions of Congolese legislation in the area of
water and public service delegation. Since 2009, a Water Law
had been debated in the DRC’s Parliament to clarify these terms.
It was finally passed in December 2015 and enacted the following
month. It clarifies many key principles for ASUREP operations. It
recognizes users’ rights to organize themselves into public utility
associations to supply drinking water services (Art. 32), including
peri-urban areas (Art. 81) and infrastructure project management
is entrusted to committees formed by the users (Art. 73).4. Discussion
4.1. An insightful yet still fragile approach
Of the eight criteria that Elinor Ostrom highlights as being cru-
cial for the long-term functioning of such institutions, those relat-
ing to cost-advantages, decision-making, monitoring, sanctions
and conflict resolution seem to be firmly rooted. The other criteria
however are still on an unsteady footing, particularly those relating
to interactions with other institutions. The definition of boundaries
remains relatively unclear given that the REGISIDO programming
takes little account of the ASUREP perimeters, which in some cases
leads to competition. Recognition by the State has also made head-
way very recently thanks to the Water Law, even if its implemen-
tation remains a challenge particularly given the shortcomings of
RDC’s decentralized administrations.
The other uncertainty involves the system’s empowerment rel-
ative to the actors who put it in place. Monitoring, conflict resolu-
tion and decision-making are still seen to be largely dependent on
the orientations and mediation of ADIR, the NGO that founded the
ASUREPs. A move has in fact begun to transfer these functions to
the FEDASU, but the process will still take a few years, and its abil-
ity to deal with crises will be the yardstick for judging its sound-
ness and political outreach.
Beyond these questions of governance, the advantages of the
decentralized ASUREP networks lie in the fact that they are techni-
cally and economically well adapted to the local context. Their size
fosters close ties between the user and network management, as
well as an ongoing proximity (physical, social, etc.) that enables
the user to know who to contact in case of a breakdown and to
have a concrete view of what the price paid is used for.
The ASUREPs thus guarantee social sustainability while at the
same time remaining cost-effective in the medium term. The
investment costs per resident range from USD 15 to 20/person.
This is much lower that the usual ratios for urban water supply;
a recent World Bank report estimates USD 150/person for the
RDC for an ‘‘advanced” water service and USD 30/person for a ‘‘ba-
sic” service (Hutton and Varughese, 2016).
However, these neighborhoods are not on the power grid and
the use of generator-produced electricity is not conducive to the
long-term economic sustainability of this technical solution. In
the long run, a centralized water system would seem more eco-
nomically viable, providing that the main operator has the capacity
to organize a scaling-up, which is uncertain at this stage. In addi-
tion, given the shortcomings of the city’s waste and wastewater
management, it is likely that the quality of the aquifer will one
day deteriorate, which would put the ASUREPs’ supply of pumped
water into question.
This situation strongly resembles the recently studied experi-
ences of coproducing urban services in developing countries
(Duque Gómez and Jaglin, 2016; Pilo, 2016). These studies suggest
that user participation plays above all a role of transitory interface
to facilitate the inclusion of informal dwellers into urbancope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
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become used to traditional schemes for urban services. Even
though substantial improvement to the traditional method of sup-
plying urban drinking water in Kinshasa is still a remote prospect,
the question remains of whether the cooperative arrangements
between the residents and the ASUREPs will lead to the emergence
of an alternative mode of provision and regulation, or whether
these arrangements will be simply an intermediary step before
the situation in normalized in line with the usual scheme of water
services.
The scope of water supply coproduction in the Kinshasa neigh-
borhoods – which is relatively operational at micro level – will
mostly depend on its capacity to become embedded in an enabling
multi-level dynamic, meaning with polycentric characteristics in
line with the analytical framework chosen for the study of the
commons (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). These characteristics
relate to the relationships among governance actors, problems,
and institutional arrangements that foster innovation and adapta-
tion through experimentation and learning. For the time being,
these conditions are far from fulfilled. The earlier mentioned obsta-
cles to the emergence of a regulatory framework and effective reg-
ulatory bodies have been explored in depth (Naulet and Biteete,
2014). This has shown that, in the short term, the further develop-
ment of self-regulatory mechanisms such as the FEDASU must be a
priority, pending a deep-seated reform of the public authorities.
One may, however, wonder how long it will take for these reforms
to materialize, as recent research on decentralization in the RDC
has shown the extent to which this movement has been accompa-
nied by an increase in predatory extraction, provincial centraliza-
tion of power, unbridled lack of accountability, and widespread
rent-seeking by provincial elites (Englebert and Mungongo, 2016).
4.2. Further prospects for this research
Two aspects highlighted in this paper doubtless deserve further
study. This case study confirms the crucial role of intermediary
actors – the ‘‘entrepreneurs of the commons” – who are seldom
taken into account in the Ostrom school of thought or in the orga-
nization of water supply systems (Moss et al., 2009). The major
strength of the ‘‘ASUREP” model is the mediating role played by
ADIR. This role is vital given the multiple points of contention that
arise. The only institution with sufficient legitimacy to take on this
role is ADIR, which helped the ASUREPs to set up and supported
them through their early stages. This support and advisory role is
very similar to the technical and financial monitoring function
ensured by external bodies that has been introduced into West
Africa (Faggianelli and Desille, 2013). The technical expertise of
ADIR’s founders, along with their capacity to serve as intermedi-
aries to channel resources to meet pressing needs, certainly helped
them build a relationship of trust and authority with the commu-
nities. Given the age and number of these associations, it is aston-
ishing that, apart from a few cases involving individuals, we found
no mention of open conflict between the certain ASUREPs and
ADIR, which nonetheless closely oversees ASUREP operations. A
deeper sociological survey on the way that local organizations
are managed in the DRC would doubtless provide insightful infor-
mation on the mechanisms for the daily negotiation of decision-
making and conflict resolution.
We chose to focus on an in-depth analysis of one experience in
the context of one African megacity. Yet, many autonomous net-
works were developed in other DRC provinces prior to the Kinshasa
ASUREPs and these are often crafted on different institutional
arrangements (Tsitsikalis, 2014). In the outskirts of Béni (north-
east DCR), for example, an international NGO has promoted the
installation of standpipes equipped with large-capacity reservoirs
managed by a community organization but occasionally filled byPlease cite this article in press as: Bédécarrats, F., et al. Building commons to
tralized water services in the outskirts of Kinshasa. J. Hydrol. (2016), http://dxREGIDESO. The context in the east of DRC appears to be different,
both in terms of its physical endowment (natural springs and sur-
face water sources) and the actors involved (many NGOs have
intervened for many years). This explains why gravity-fed water
supply systems have succeeded and are managed differently
(monthly household contributions not linked to volume consumed,
no energy costs, etc.). Attempts to create ASUREPs in Bas Congo
Province have led to very different results from those in Kinshasa.
The particularities of these Bas Congo initiatives are mainly due to
the absence of groundwater, which means that pumping opera-
tions are on distant site located in a sugar refinery, which gener-
ates high costs, and also to the different socio-economic
composition of the population.
It would have been useful to employ a comparative approach
mobilizing the SES framework to gain a wider understanding of
the general determinants of the success or failure of DWS initia-
tives As the present paper is a milestone in a broader collective
research agenda that applies the Commons perspective to develop-
ment processes, we plan to focus a forthcoming study on a compar-
ative approach using the SES framework.5. Conclusion
Kinshasa is a megacity characterized by high, uncontrolled
urban growth, weak State institutions and a decades-long lag in
terms of public investment. This context highlights the inadequacy
often pinpointed in several African cities (Jaglin and Zérah, 2010) of
the ideal model of a public service based on a government mono-
poly that organizes the technical planning of supply. Demand
seems very largely unmet and, to fill these gaps, other market-
based types of supply have been set up. The system that is mush-
rooming in Kinshasa is one of small-scale, technically autonomous
networks managed by user communities.
When compared with the shortcomings of the main water util-
ity, these small-scale networks exhibit enviable operational perfor-
mances. The strength of these decentralized water systems is their
capacity to manage a close and relatively transparent relationship
with users in a predominantly informal context (no land registry or
postal service, difficult access during the rainy season, etc.). The
relationship of trust formed between users and managers is what
constitutes the social capital of a public water service, and this
seems as important as the infrastructure capital required for the
effective functioning of the service. Yet, several challenges remain.
Coordination between the ASUREPs and REGIDESO certainly
seems crucial as, if both continue to extend their service areas, they
will increasingly find themselves in competition. A long-term
vision for development is required, but the master plan for the Kin-
shasa drinking water supply system dates back to 2006 and has
still not been updated. These two actors could find a common
interest in collaborating: the ASUREPs could purchase water
wholesale from REGIDESO and distribute it in areas where they
are more efficient and where the public utility is unable to guaran-
tee an operational water service.
Today, the service provided by the ASUREPs is a ‘‘basic” service.
However, user demand, ADIR’s approach and the standards recom-
mended by the technical and financial partners will combine in the
future to drive upgrading in terms of proximity, service continuity
and volumes. Some ASUREPs are already facing a huge demand for
private connections and they will inevitably become more profes-
sionalized. Will they manage to maintain a high level of social par-
ticipation when the role of salaried technicians becomes even more
valued and the stakes of decisions become more and more techni-
cally complex?
Moreover, the increase in drinking water supply to peripheral
neighborhoods will make it increasingly urgent to improve urbancope with chaotic urbanization? Performance and sustainability of decen-
.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.07.023
F. Bédécarrats et al. / Journal of Hydrology xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 13sanitation. Yet, planning and implementing the required invest-
ment on the scale of a megacity such as Kinshasa is not a simple
choice. What is commendable, however, is the fact that in 2013
the city adopted a strategic master plan for the Kinshasa
metropolitan area.
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